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Social capital means the set of norms, institutions and orga-
nizations that promote trust and cooperation among persons
in communities and also in wider society. In those formula-
tions of the social capital paradigm (and of the
neoinstitutional economics on which they are partly based)
which focus on its collective manifestations, it is claimed
that stable relationships based on trust and cooperation can
reduce transaction costs, produce public goods and facili-
tate the constitution of social actors and even of sound civil
societies. Community social capital is a particular form of
social capital which comprises the informal content of insti-
tutions that aim to contribute to the common good. Even
some of the foundational authors of the social capital para-
digm have doubts about the feasibility of creating such cap-
ital in groups where it does not already exist. The peasant
communities of Chiquimula (Guatemala) covered by the
anti-poverty “Support Project for Small-scale Producers of
Zacapa and Chiquimula” (PROZACHI) displayed a rela-
tively individualistic culture of dependence and domination
yet at the same time had a broad and dynamic repertoire of
various norms, including some which could serve as a sym-
bolic support for solidary and reciprocal practices.
Chiquimula seemed to lack social capital institutions, but
with the recovery of institutional practices of the past and
the emergence of new contexts and opportunities for devel-
oping new group strategies it has been possible to create so-
cial capital in these communities, with external support and
training, and thus turn an excluded sector into a social actor
on the micro-regional scene.
I
Social capital
1. A useful conceptual tool
A vigorous debate is currently under way in aca-
demic circles and also in development agencies on
the theory of social capital. This emergent paradigm
aims to be a kind of unified theory incorporating
concepts from different fields, such as reciprocity,
social networks, participatory development and gov-
ernance. It promises to be a valuable tool for the
analysis and promotion of peasant-level develop-
ment. The term “social capital” embraces the norms,
institutions and organizations that promote trust and
cooperation among persons, in communities and also
in wider society. In those formulations of this con-
cept (and of the neoinstitutional economics on which
they are partly based) which focus on its collective
manifestations, it is claimed that stable relationships
based on mutual confidence and cooperation can re-
duce transaction costs (Coase, 1937), produce public
goods (North, 1990) and facilitate the constitution of
social actors and even sound civil societies (Putnam,
1993a).
This article analyses a particular form of social
capital –community social capital– and the possibil-
ity of creating it where it does not already exist in or-
der to overcome the poverty and political exclusion
of rural communities in Latin America.
In the definition followed here, cultural norms of
mutual trust and interpersonal networks of reciproc-
ity are “precursors” of the institutions - more com-
plex and guided by norms of common well-being-
which constitute community social capital and which
spring from those precursors at the level of the com-
munity or social system. Some authors consider that
social capital is made up of all the interpersonal links
that can activate an individual, corresponding to what
were already known as diffuse self-centered net-
works of reciprocity, while at the other extreme the
definition of community social capital (from the
neoinstitutionalist standpoint) given by Putnam and
North –according to which social capital is what
gives rise to cooperation and civism, so that if there
is civism there will be social capital– has rightly
been described as tautological (Portes, 1998; Portes
and Landholt, 1996).
In contrast, what we are maintaining in this arti-
cle is that: i) community social capital is not an indi-
vidual resource but a form of social institutionality
(of the group, in this case the local community), and
ii) the (explicit or implicit) participants in commu-
nity social capital have the common good as their ob-
jective, even though this may not be achieved.
Furthermore, unlike formal institutions for the com-
mon good (such as cooperatives, for example), which
exist “on paper”, community social capital is made
up of norms, practices and interpersonal relations
which exist and can be observed. It is the informal
institutionality inside and outside the formal organi-
zations, at the level of the community or broader so-
cial system, that determines how such organizations
work in practice: what Firth (1963) called “social or-
ganization”.
Although the members of the community in
which community social capital exists shaer a dis-
course of cooperation for the common good, empiri-
cal observation is needed in order to see whether this
objective is actually attained, for community social
capital and interpersonal reciprocity may cause ef-
fects which run counter to the common good, as in
the case of some ethnic or religious communities
whose practices are exclusive or do not respect fun-
damental human rights.
Finally, the concept of reciprocity is a central el-
ement of the social capital paradigm. The anthropo-
logical treatment of this matter has been constructed
on the basis of the classic study Essai sur le don by
Marcel Mauss (published in 1950),1 which had an
enormous impact on that discipline from the 1950s
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on.2 he importance of reciprocity goes beyond its
presence in “diadic” relations between two persons
(Foster, 1961): as a ruling principle it also extends to
formal and informal institutional relationships at the
community level. In his essay, Mauss notes that in
pre-mercantile societies (and to a lesser extent also in
our own societies, outside the ambit of the market)
there are systems of exchanges based on gifts (ob-
jects, aid, favours) which must be repaid, but not
necessarily immediately or always in precisely equiv-
alent terms, unlike mercantile transactions (Mauss,
1990). In a socially delimited environment (a tradi-
tional society or most present-day peasant communi-
ties) with long-term relationships established through a
large number of past interactions and a long-term per-
spective, relations tend to take place at the same mo-
ment between the same persons and families in all
areas and all institutions of human life (religious, juridi-
cal, political, family and economic): in this sense, they
are “total phenomena” (Mauss, 1990). For this reason,
although reciprocity might at first sight seem to be a
minor social phenomenon among many others, it is in
fact the basis of social capital institutions in contexts
like that of a peasant community.
2. Doubts about the constructability of social
capital
Strangely enough, even some of the foundational au-
thors, such as Robert Putnam, have doubts about the
feasibility of creating social capital in groups where
it does not already exist. Thus, for example, Putnam
(1993a, p. 184) finally decides that “where institu-
tion-building is concerned, time is measured in de-
cades” while the process of changing norms of
reciprocity and values of civic engagement “proba-
bly moves even more slowly”.
This pessimistic view reflects a belief in feed-
back mechanisms that constantly strengthen existing
norms and forms of behaviour, bringing all
socio-cultural systems to either a positive social
equilibrium in which social capital is built up, or to a
negative “acivic” society. According to Putnam, in
the “acivic” south of Italy society was trapped for
centuries in a repeated negative path in which
“mutual distrust and defection, vertical dependence
and exploitation ….. have reinforced each other
in interminable vicious circles …..” (Putnam, 1993a,
p. 181).
II
The construction of social capital
in Eastern Guatemala
1. The peasant communities of Chiquimula:
an empty institutional landscape?
Rural communities in Eastern and Western Guate-
mala are often contrasted in terms similar to the con-
trasts Putnam makes between the South and North of
Italy. There is a widespread perception that the Ma-
yan corporate communities in the western highlands
are more oriented towards collective deci-
sion-making, whereas those in the eastern lowlands
are “individualistic”, with little participation in com-
munity organizations.
In the 1990s, the “Support Project for the
Small-scale Producers of Zacapa and Chiquimula”
(PROZACHI) was carried out for seven years in eight
municipalities of Eastern Guatemala3 with a view to
significantly increasing the incomes of poor hillside
farmers in an economically, ecologically and institu-
tionally sustainable manner (IFAD, 1998). Its strategy
for overcoming poverty was centered on facilitating
the peasants’ access to bank finance, but it also pro-
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vided support through its own team of professionals
and technicians (in agricultural advisory assistance
and technical training, road construction, organiza-
tion and management, environmental conservation,
housing improvement, participation of peasant
women in development, marketing, etc.).
When PROZACHI began its activities in 1991, its
target group –5,000 peasant families cultivating
mainly maize and beans in over 130 hillside villages
and hamlets– was largely devoid of significant grass-
roots organizations (FLACSO, 1993). There were a
few civic committees, but they were mostly small
factions or passive recipients of aid from charitable
NGOs. PROZACHI officials were therefore pessimistic
and reticent about the possibility of promoting par-
ticipation by the beneficiaries in taking Project deci-
sions: in short, this was another example of the
“acivic” cultures described by Putnam.
2. Scaling down and scaling up
It was then observed, however, that the dispersed
pattern of human settlement in the hillside hamlets of
the PROZACHI area of influence (see maps 1 and 2)
corresponded to “local descent groups”: that is, net-
works of kin and neighbours who believe they are
descended from a common ancestor (Wolf, 1996). In
each village or hamlet the same surnames tended to
be repeated in a large proportion of households, and
some place names corresponded to the surnames of
the purported founders (Durston, 1992). In these lo-
cal descent groups, which are found in upland areas
all over Latin America, residence of newlyweds
tends to be virilocal (i.e., near the husband’s parents)
and interconnected multiplex ties of reciprocity
based on close kinship lead to both horizontal and
vertical trust and cooperation.
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MAP 1
Guatemala: Location of PROZACHI’s area of influence
Source: IFAD (1998).
A Guatemalan anthropologist, Hugo Zelaya,
was hired to activate work in the field of “partici-
patory planning”, and he designed a system of core
groups (Grupos Núcleo) –7 to 12 households
united by close neighbourhood– to participate in
determining the needs and priorities of those gain-
ing access to the services and benefits offered by
the Project (see PROZACHI, 1995). Some 40 rural
development promotion workers, immersed in the
hillside villages, promoted house-to-house the ben-
efits of participating in the exercise. Each core
group selected two leaders to moderate their meet-
ings and serve as liaison with PROZACHI. Over 400
core groups were formed, and became the source
of proposals for modifying the annual operating
plan of the Project.
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MAP 2
Guatemala: Area of influence of PROZACHI
The period of most intense growth of the core
groups coincided with a big increase in the number
of households receiving credit: from 525 in 1992 to
3,676 in 1994. Although there were several factors
which combined to bring about these changes, Pro-
ject staff and peasants agree that the creation of these
core groups were largely responsible for this.
After three years of activity of the core groups,
an assembly of their representatives proposed the es-
tablishment of coordination mechanisms at the
multi-village level as a more efficient way of work-
ing. An advisory study designed a system of commu-
nity councils incorporating all the committees and
organized groups, building upon the previous
grass-roots groundwork but largely replacing the
small interfamily groups as the most frequent in-
stances of civic participation. Initiatives by PROZACHI
staff began to take a back seat to spontaneous pro-
posals by the peasants on support for the organiza-
tion and its concrete actions.
The number of specific interest groups, such as
drinking water supply committees or cooperative mi-
cro-enterprises, increased by 28% between 1991 and
1998 (table 1). Over a hundred community councils
and eight municipal coordinating committees were
formed, and what seems even more important is that
56% of these community organizations were evalu-
ated as having medium or high levels of
self-management capability (table 2). Finally, in the
first quarter of 1998 a regional* association of repre-
sentatives of these rural community organizations
was set up and began to play a role in the establish-
ment of rural development priorities in the region.
3. Roots of social capital in Chiquimula
Looking back, there are various aspects of the social
capital formation process in Chiquimula which help
to explain how it was possible to construct such capi-
tal in that “acivic” region in a much shorter space
than the decades foreseen by Putnam. The first of
these factors was the existence of the local descent
groups, which were repositories of reciprocity and
precursors of the core groups.
A second factor was the shared identity of the
inhabitants. Although the peasantry of Eastern Gua-
temala is usually conceived of as being “ladino”
(non-indigenous), barely a generation ago social in-
stitutions based on Ch’ortí Mayan lineages predomi-
nated in most of the hillside communities, and the
Ch’ortí language is still spoken in a number of vil-
lages. In the 1994 census, over 70,000 residents of
the Department of Chiquimula identified themselves
as Ch’ortí. The consciousness of these roots and the
strengthening of the Ch’ortí language and culture
have been furthered by the national Maya movcment
since the mid-1990s (Metz, 1998). Other elements
strengthening their identity is that they are all “peas-
ants”, all come from the same area, and belong to the
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TABLE 1
Chiquimula and Zacapa (Guatemala):
Growth of peasant organizations at
five territorial levels, 1991-1998
Territorial level 1991 1998
Local descent groups
(village level) - 440
Specific interest groups 380 487
Community level
(inter-village level) - 129
Municipal level - 8
Regional level - 1
Source: Support Project for Small-Scale Producers of Zacapa and
Chiquimula (PROZACHI).
TABLE 2




Number (Number of villages)
Area of
villages Incipient Interme- Consoli-
diate dated
Jocotán 49 14 17 18
Olapa 35 18 13 4
La Unión 19 11 3 5
Quezaltepeque 26 14 12 -
Total 129 57 45 27
Percentgage 100 44 35 21
Source: Support Project for Small-Scale Producers of Zacapa and
Chiquimula (PROZACHI).
same community. Thus, while the identities of the
Chiquimula hillside villagers are mixed and varied,
they all see themselves as the opposite to the domi-
nant urban dwellers, and this serves as a source of
cohesion and trust among the members of the differ-
ent rural communities.
The third factor was memories of the past. In the
1960s the Belgian Catholic Mission established a
number of agricultural cooperatives and self-help in-
frastructure development committees in villages
which were visited by PROZACHI three decades later.
Though repressed during the late 1960s, those orga-
nizations were remembered by the peasants when
discussing the pros and cons of participating in the
new organizations promoted by PROZACHI.
The fourth factor was indeed the reduction of re-
pression. In the 1990s the Army began to gradually
withdraw from direct participation in political deci-
sion-making at the national level: a process that cul-
minated with the signing of the peace accords in late
1996. In Chiquimula, the village “Comisionados
Militares” and “Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil”
ceased to exist as such, and the regional army base
was shut down, so that the structural situation be-
came much more favourable for peasant organiza-
tions.
The fifth factor was the initiation of the process
of empowerment of peasant women. The registration
of hundreds of women in the Civil Register for the
first time, with the support of PROZACHI, the forma-
tion of women’s production groups, aided with credit
and advisory assistance (Lundius, 1998), and their
incorporation into community discussions set loose
and trained human resources which had previously
been excluded. These changes strengthened the pro-
cess of self-diagnosis and the democratization of
leadership, which are essential elements of social
capital.
The sixth factor was the interaction of peasants
with the rural development promoters, who lived in
the midst of the villages and whose presence in the
local and regional social environment was scheduled
to last for several years. The promoters naturally par-
ticipated in the “total service systems” and in the re-
ciprocal relations which Mauss described. This gave
rise to stable relationships, strengthened by the ex-
pectation of future interactions and by the affective
links that arose from the past history of practices of
mutual aid and the return of such favours at other
times (see Evans, 1996). On the one hand, the per-
sonal commitment shown by the promoter to the
members of the community stimulated the participa-
tion of peasants in PROZACHI’s activities, which thus
gained in prestige, while on the other hand the vari-
ous forms of aid given by the promoters strengthened
the relations of reciprocity and solidarity among the
inhabitants of the area themselves.
The above six factors contributed to the creation
of social capital, but the materialization of its poten-
tial was due to the initiatives of PROZACHI and, as
from March 1997, of the Social Investment Fund
(FIS).4 Firstly, training programmes were designed in
order to create social capital by strengthening social
skills and capabilities in the fields of diagnosis, com-
munication and planning. By 1995, at the request of
villagers themselves, over 400 organizational train-
ing “events” per year were being held. In order to do
this it was necessary to adapt the available methods
and materials to local conditions, to design new tech-
niques, and to publish a series of pamphlets for
group discussion.
SECONDLY, PROZACHI AND FIS gave peasants the
opportunity to exercise these new-found skills and
social capital associations to obtain direct material
benefits from the Project and FIS. Thirdly, both
PROZACHI and FIS protected the peasants’ embryonic
community social capital institutions while authorita-
tive clientelism was still present in the region and in-
tervened when they were threatened by hostile social
actors.
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without cost to them.
III
Lessons for social capital building
The analysis made here of the Chiquimula experi-
ence suggests a need for some revision of the social
capital paradigm with regard to the obstacles for the
construction of such capital, and these theoretical
modifications have their own policy implications.
Firstly, trust and reciprocity that go beyond the
nuclear household and are to be found in the local
descent groups are associated with close kinship ties
and long-time interaction with neigbours and appear
to be found in all peasant societies everywhere (see
Wilson, 1997).
Secondly, and in line with more modern game
theory, the frequent repetition of exercises requiring
trust and cooperation among peasants has created a
growing disposition –slow and uncertain to begin
with, but later faster– to cooperate reciprocally in
community life (Axelrod, 1997). Confidence is built
on the past, not on the future: on experience of past
fulfillment which shows people’s trustworthiness, not
on agreements and promises for the future. In situa-
tions where past conflict had undermined trust (as in
Chiquimula), these cooperation exercises have cre-
ated a recent history of trustworthiness as the basis
for future collaboration.
Thirdly, vertical reciprocity has proved to be a
necessary part of social capital building, both inside
and outside the community. Almost all social capital
theorists consider that vertical reciprocity relation-
ships represent the opposite to social capital, because
they involve people of unequal power and are there-
fore asymmetrical. However, the distinctions be-
tween vertical and horizontal reciprocity are not so
clear-cut in real life.
1. Vertical reciprocity among peasants as a
basis for social capital
In the peasant communities of Chiquimula, some
household heads, especially older ones, lead
multi-household groups –or less clearly-defined
“quasi-groups” (Mayer, 1966)– of kin and neigh-
bours that serve to accumulate both wealth and pres-
tige. Thus, on the one hand vertical reciprocity and
factionalism are intrinsic to the interpersonal net-
works of peasant communities, but on the other hand
the leadership based on this vertical reciprocity can
be the basis for cooperation and scaling-up the orga-
nization beyond the local village level. These leaders
of quasi-groups are entrepreneurs of social capital,
managing the human resources of their kin and
neighbours, to whom they are in turn accountable.
In Chiquimula, the social skills and cooperation
practices developed in the core groups were passed
on by their leaders at the regional level, where these
representatives negotiated with their peers from other
organizations. Ultimately, the techniques for creating
cooperation also helped to scale up peasant organiza-
tion. These new leaders, formed in the core groups,5
and the regional coordinators elected from among
them, also created a dense communications network
within a dispersed social system in which repression
had further increased isolation.
2. Clientelism and vertical reciprocity as bases
for social capital
The vertical clientelism linking the hillside villages
of Chiquimula with broader society did not disappear
along with the direct military presence but continued
to operate in an authoritarian manner, both through
local bossism in party politics and through economic
relations with landowners and urban middlemen.
Even the potential for local social capital creation
provided by the reforms aimed at the decentraliza-
tion of official decision-making and resource alloca-
tion served to strengthen local caciques because of
their privileged access to those resources and spaces
(see Galeano and Yore, 1994). In short, the contin-
ued presence of authoritarian clientelism in the area
made necessary some form of outside support for the
incipient community social capital.
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However, such outside support is also a form of
semi-clientelism. In this respect, the distinction
drawn by Jonathan Fox between authoritarian
clientelism and semi-clientelism (Fox, 1996) is
highly relevant. In contrast with authoritarian
clientelism, the dominant actors in semi-clientelism
renounce the use of force and repression, instead fur-
thering their interests by providing needed services
to their clients or gaining their allegiance in a negoti-
ated, shared political cause.
PROZACHI and FIS come close to Fox’s definition
of semi-clientelistic outside agencies. Their staff
members identified with the beneficiaries and pro-
vided more democratic vertical reciprocity relations
which facilitated peasants’ access to growing public
resources and reformist allies at the central level (see
Tendler, 1997). Both these institutions contributed to
the process of local and microregional democratiza-
tion, and their activities were a key factor in creating
the necessary conditions for the generation of peas-
ant community social capital. At the same time, they
served to strengthen the transformation of reciprocity
and local identity into peasant social capital institu-
tions and to take advantage of the changes in the na-
tional context, establishing a protective umbrella for
this embryonic social capital.
Although building formal institutions for par-
ticipation was part of their work, a much more im-
portant factor was their impact on informal
institutions (see figure 1), which, as noted by
Putnam (1993a), penetrate the formal institutions
and often turn their real operation against demo-
cratic development. The introduction of
semi-clientelism in a context of new opportunities
weakened authoritarian clientelism. Community
social capital arose from the synergy between this
semi-clientelism and the precursors of reciprocity
in the local descent groups; at the time it also
helped to weaken authoritarian clientelism in the
area, with the emergence of peasant social actors at
the regional level and the resulting democratiza-
tion of relationships in the region.
3. Alternative cultural repertoires and norms
In more general terms, the experience in Chiquimula
suggests that some modifications should be made in
the view of cultural determinism and negative social
equilibria that forms part of the theoretical frame-
work of social capital posited by Putnam and others.
For Putnam, cultural norms of distrust and depend-
ence are rigid traditions which resist structural
changes in formal institutions. However, the peasants
in Chiquimula proved to have a very broad cultural
repertoire, with alternative norms that included not
just distrust and dependence but also norms of auton-
omous action and accountability to their kin groups
and communities.
Both North and Putnam recognize that there are
feedback mechanisms between social and cultural
subsystems, but the main thrust of their arguments
concerning social capital is fundamentally determin-
istic, ascribing almost all forms of behaviour to cul-
tural factors. Putnam draws a universal conclusion
from his Italian case study, asserting that there are
“two social equilibria”: the equilibrium of societies
rich in social capital, and the equilibrium of those
characterized by distrust, betrayal and authoritarian-
ism (Putnam, 1993a, p. 177). The essence of this
model –implicitly derived from economic equilib-
rium theory– is that “path dependence” means the
constant strengthening of these two opposing sets of
norms and practices whose directions became set in
the past (Putnam, 1993a, p. 179).
However, rather than being coherent and immu-
table sets of rules and beliefs, cultures are constantly
changing and include an enormous range or reper-
toire (Swidler, 1986) of alternative “sentences” that
are no longer used and fragments of “sentences”
which are reworked and recombined daily by persons
and groups because of the need to adapt to the
changes that cultures are constantly encountering in
their environment. These alternative norms, which
were kept submerged during the period of repressive
authoritarian clientelism, resurfaced when the
socio-political climate changed. When some leaders
continued to exhibit passive and subjugatory “path
dependent” attitudes, failing to take the initiative or
continuing to seek personal gain from their role of
nexus with the “outside world”, the communities -es-
pecially the younger members- recalled these other
traditional principles to them and either brought
about changes in the leaders’ behaviour or, in some
cases, changed the leaders themselves. The existence
of these alternative cultural repertoires also explains
why some changes in the social structure (in this
case, the disappearance of the system of
“Comisionados Militares” and the emergence of re-
formist national elites) led to rapid changes in the
norms on cooperation and social capital.
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4. Co-evolution of strategies
The second weak point in Putnam’s argument
against the possibility of rapid social capital building
is the idea that “acivic” social systems always tend
towards a negative equilibrium with a high degree of
distrust and egoism. In Chiquimula, however, the re-
gional socio-political system quickly ceased to be
purely authoritarian and began to change into a sys-
tem of semi-clientelism: into what complexity theory
calls a “transition phase” to an agent-based system
(Cowan and others, 1994). In this view, social sys-
tems never naturally tend towards equilibrium but in-
stead there is a situation where the strategies of
numerous agents constantly co-evolve, sometimes
slowly, sometimes quickly, and social relationships
and institutions “emerge” from this process (Arrow,
1994).
The systemic transition phase in Chiquimula
marked the end of a period of slow change: the long
period of authoritarian clientelism and repression.
The new conditions gave rise to very rapid changes
in the strategies and relations of both old and new ac-
tors, putting an end to path dependence and speeding
up the formation of peasant social capital and its
presence as a social actor in the region (figure 1).
Accelerated co-evolution of the social actors’
strategies began in early 1997, when PROZACHI and
FIS encouraged the formation of committees for the
coordination of rural community organizations at the
municipal level. Authoritarian mayors and their par-
ties co-opted these committees through the participa-
tion of local and national government functionaries
on the directorates of these committees, but in some
municipalities the villagers reacted by proposing that
those functionaries should be limited to an advisory
role. The mayors complained about this strategy to
the regional (Departmental) governor, to which the
villagers reacted by boycotting the meetings of their
own municipal coordination committees. Local FIS
officials responded by proposing to the national gov-
ernment that the villagers’ proposal be accepted. Af-
ter this official legitimation, the villagers formed
new municipal coordinating committees in which
public officials were relegated to an advisory role.
The mayors’ strategies in response to this varied:
some continued to oppose the dilution of their local
control, but others allied themselves with these new
social actors by providing space and transportation
for their meetings. FIS began to channel its financial
and technical support for social infrastructure con-
struction directly through these more autonomous
committees and community councils.
The equilibrium view of economic and social
systems has been challenged by the newest versions
of the theory of complex agent-based adaptive sys-
tems, applicable to a wide range of areas, from eco-
systems to stock markets. This recent line of theory
contains two basic challenges to Putnam’s and
North’s dual equilibrium concept in complexity the-
ory. Firstly, as Durlauf (1997) has pointed out, path
dependence continues only until there is a new shock
to the system. Such a shock may be initially small,
but if it changes the opportunity structure for differ-
ent kinds of actors, the resulting changes in their be-
haviour can end up by erasing old paths and tracing
new ones. Secondly, Arrow (1994) argues that com-
plexity theory has shown that economic and social
institutions are not the result of planning or a ten-
dency towards equilibrium but emerge from the
co-evolution of the strategies of numerous agents
who interact both to compete and to cooperate. A
system may thus exhibit a temporary stable state un-
til a critical mass of agents perceive change, opt for
new strategies, and find ways to implement them that
fit in with others’ strategies. These changes in strate-
gies can produce a phase transition in the system in
which very rapid institutional change opens up new
directions, as contrasted with the slow, unidirectional
reinforcing changes that occur while path depend-
ence obtains.
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FIGURE 1
Chiquimula (Guatemala): Changes in
the informal institutional structure in
projects with peasant participation







Precursors: reciprocity, Local descent
identity, cooperation among group
kin and neighbours
In Chiquimula, the emergence of social capital
originated in both cultural messages and structural
changes. On the one hand, the pro-cooperation pros-
elytizing of PROZACHI staff struck old but familiar
chords concerning good neighbourliness and the im-
peratives of diffuse reciprocity, while the message of
peace and democracy brought new ideas that struck
against the established relations of authoritarian
clientelistic structures. As a result, leaders began to
take the initiative rather than waiting for orders from
above, and younger persons began to reject corrupt
authoritarian local “brokers”, reminding them and
the community of the old rule that their first loyalty
should be to their own people.
Any kind of change in the balance of power
among national political elites can open up the possi-
bility of ending path dependence in authoritarian
clientelistic structures. Thus, the emergence of new
forms of semi-clientelism is not necessarily associ-
ated exclusively with progressive reformists, since
even relatively conservative reformists can find rea-
sons to ally with local base groups. Both such types
of reformists played their part in the rapid transition
that took place in Chiquimula in the mid-1990s.
The transition from an authoritarian to a
semi-clientelistic system in the region involved an
acceleration of social actors’ reactions and the adap-
tation of their strategies, after an initial phase of slow
change, and led to the emergence of new norms,
forms of behaviour and relationships which hastened
the consolidation of peasant social capital and, in
essence, set up a new institutional context in the region.
This strengthening of peasant social capital was
a chain of action and reaction among at least three
main social actors: the provincial urban elites, out-
side anti-poverty agencies, and the hillside communi-
ties themselves. The history of the construction of
peasant social capital in Chiquimula is also, then, the
history of the creation of a new social actor and a
transition from the norms, forms of behaviour and re-
lationships typical of authoritarian clientelism to
those of semi-clientelism.
Such a change was possible only because hill-
side village communities had already built (or re-
built) their rudimentary social capital at the
beginning of this process and could therefore inter-
vene and adapt as social actors, reacting to the strate-
gies of their opponents and allies alike. While not the
ideal environment for peasant social capital,
semi-clientelism tolerated its existence and allowed
room for its strengthening and accumulation.
5. Stages in the evolution of the social actors’
strategies
The co-evolution of the social actors’ strategies in
Chiquimula over the seven-year period studied here
can be divided into four main stages:
a) Slow change with authoritarian clientelism
(1991-1993)
In this first stage, clientelistic political parties
and local economic elites dominated the population
through authoritarian clientelistic systems, with sup-
port from the military; the anti-poverty agencies lim-
ited their actions to the technocratic provision of
services to passive beneficiaries in the villages, in a
relatively steady state of the regional system.
b) Incipient transition phase (1993-1996)
This stage began when PROZACHI decided to
change its strategy, promoting embryonic peasant
economic organizations around small production and
marketing groups and encouraging grass-roots par-
ticipation in project planning through the core
groups, within the protected environment of Project
activities and with short-term material benefits to
participants.
Clientelistic political parties reacted by express-
ing alarm through local political caciques, but al-
though Project personnel were sometimes changed,
PROZACHI was able to continue its new activities be-
cause of alliances with national reformist groups.
Hillside villagers slowly began to cooperate among
themselves and cultivated an alliance with PROZACHI,
which, in turn, intensified training in organizational
skills at the request of the villagers.
c) Accelerated co-evolution of actors’ strategies
(1997)
Early in 1997 PROZACHI and FIS encouraged the
formation of both inter-village councils and munici-
pal coordinating committees for those councils.
In February and March 1997, FIS trained and
supported peasant organizations in the presentation
of proposals for the financing of social and produc-
tive infrastructure projects.
In April-June 1997 village organizations met to
form municipal coordinating committees. Clientelistic
political parties co-opted most such committees
through the participation of local and national gov-
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ernment functionaries on their directorates, to which
the villagers reacted by proposing that such function-
aries should be limited to an advisory role. In re-
sponse, the political parties protested through the
mayors to the regional (Departmental) governor, al-
leging that such limitations on the functionaries
would be illegal. After the villagers reacted by boy-
cotting municipal committee meetings, local FIS offi-
cials proposed to the national government that the
villagers’ proposal should be accepted, and a re-
gional seminar was held by FIS, with the participa-
tion of functionaries of the Governor’s office and the
municipalities, to explain the benefits of this ap-
proach in the context following the signing of the
peace accords.
d) Emergence of semi-clientelism (1997-1998)
In mid-1997 the village councils formed new
municipal coordinating committees in which public
officials were relegated to an advisory role. The
mayors’ strategies in response to this varied: some
flatly rejected this innovation, but others allied them-
selves with these new social actors, providing them
with transportation and premises for their meetings.
FIS channeled financial support directly to these au-
tonomous councils.
In late 1997 and early 1998 one political party
requested a peasant organization’s support for its
mayoral candidate. The organization refused, how-
ever, because it had not participated in the process of
selection of the candidate.
In mid-1998 eight municipal coordinating com-
mittees joined together to create a regional organiza-
tion. PROZACHI subcontracted road repair and other
services to the new organization. Local village orga-
nizations began to take more initiatives, proposing
infrastructure projects and participating in school
co-management schemes. A peasant leader ran suc-
cessfully for a position as member of a municipal
council. The regional peasant organization asked
PROZACHI for the loan of its heavy road-making
machinery. PROZACHI initiated a new phase
(PROZACHI-2) in which local, municipal and regional
peasant organizations participate in a co-management
process aimed at achieving the autonomous institu-
tional sustainability of the organizations and enter-
prises created between 1991 and 1998.
Thus, the rapid changes in actors’ strategies in
the transition phase and the resulting systemic modi-
fication are among the possible reasons for the rela-
tive rapidity with which peasant social capital was
constructed in Chiquimula. Another important factor
was the existence of methodologies for building
community social capital which made it possible to
achieve goals set intentionally. PROZACHI and FIS
staff were thus able to prepare the neophyte social
actors in the hillside villages in time for them to take
advantage of the opportunities and challenges that
emerged in the mid-1990s in Chiquimula: this stan-
dard methodology gave more rapid results than spon-
taneous changes or reliance on the side-effects of
other kinds of public action (Putnam, 1993b).
IV
Conclusions
1. Is it possible to construct social capital?
Does the experience of PROZACHI and FIS show that
it is possible to construct social capital where
“acivic” norms and practices predominate? The an-
swer depends in part on whether the achievements
described above constitute social capital according to
the strict definition given at the beginning of this ar-
ticle: i.e., institutions based on trust and cooperation
that constitute economic public goods or that con-
tribute to the civic public good. In the case of
Chiquimula –although the question of economic ben-
efit calls for further research-6 he answer in the
second case is “yes” (box 1).
First, the purposeful construction of peasant so-
cial capital achieved a (relatively) limited objective:
the empowerment of hillside villagers as part of the
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6 Nevertheless, preliminary evidence indicates that access to in-
puts and markets, as well as productivity, improved for most
peasant families. Some 200 new associative micro-enterprises
were set up within the framework of PROZACHI, presumably
with attendant savings of transaction costs, while market imper-
fections were reduced both in smallholder coffee wholesaling
and in the local rural day-labour market.
effort to achieve a sustainable reduction of poverty.
Second, this empowerment involved the constitution
of a new social actor in the area, incorporating into
civic affairs a social sector previously excluded from
public decision-making, which in itself represents a
strengthening of local and regional democracy in
Guatemala. Third, the consolidation of peasant terri-
torial organizations led to a rapid transition from a
repressive, authoritarian structure to a semi-
clientelistic system in flux, which constitutes a step
forward towards the establishment of a strong re-
gional civil society and opens the way for further ad-
vances in this direction.
The basic intention of this study has been to
show how and why, in one empirical case, the theo-
retical proposition that building social capital from
scratch is always a slow, nearly impossible task did
not hold good. Analysis of this experience also sug-
gests some possible revisions to social capital theory
and some conclusions on policies and measures in
the field of rural community empowerment. The sug-
gested measures for promoting community social
capital are summarized in box 2.7
2. Final remarks
In the final analysis, the stereotype view of peasant
culture in Chiquimula does contain an element of
truth. It is indeed a relatively individualistic culture
marked by dependence and domination, yet paradox-
ically at the same time it is a culture with a broad and
dynamic repertoire of varied norms, including some
which can serve as the symbolic basis for supportive
and reciprocal practices. Chiquimula seemed to lack
social capital institutions, but only until the institu-
tional practices of the past were rescued and contexts
and opportunities favourable for the development of
new group strategies arose.
Path dependence proved to be less of an obstacle
to peasant social capital building than the cultural ob-
stacle represented by authoritarian clientelism, since
it quickly gave way to the changes brought about in
the political structure by the presence of new social
actors in Chiquimula and the peace accords.
Although there was an apparent absence of so-
cial capital in the hillside villages, in reality there
were important precursors of cooperation which were
utilized through the initial restriction of PROZACHI’s
activities to the local descent group level, with subse-
quent extension to the community, municipal and re-
gional levels. An exercise of “social capital
archaeology” revealed memories of the past suc-
cesses of a previous generation.
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BOX 1
SOME HYPOTHESES ABOUT BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL
– Reciprocity norms and practices exist in small local groups everywhere. Cooperation and accountable lead-
ership are a part of most modern human cultures as a result of multilevel selection; iteration of practices
previously found to be satisfactory usually leads to cooperation.
– Cultures contain changing repertoires with contradictory content. Systemic change can come from culture
or from social structure. Removal or reduction of repression allows social capital to re-emerge; complex
systems do not tend toward equilibrium but change constantly through co-evolution of the strategies of dif-
ferent actors.
– Changes in national elites produce “windows of opportunity” for the emergence of local social capital. Al-
liances with reformist sectors in government open the way to social capital building.
– Trust, cooperation, shared identity and reciprocity created in the community can be replicated among lead-
ers in order to “scale up” social capital from small communities to the regional level.
– Methodologies and techniques now exist that make possible the construction of social capital intentionally,
rather than as a side-product of other activities or as a spontaneous phenomenon.
7 A number of the suggestions set forth in box 2 were incorpo-
rated in the design of “PROZACHI-2”, a new project
(1998-2002) to consolidate and ensure the institutional
sustainability of peasant self-management in the area, which is
being supported by the Government of the Netherlands.
The emergent peasant social actors, with the
support of outside institutional allies, took advantage
of the opportunities created by the changes that took
place in the national elites, participated in the rapid
co-evolution of the strategies of various local social
actors, and helped to lay the foundations for a new
semi-clientelistic structure in the region which was
more favourable to the development of democratic
and participatory civil society.
The application of the existing organizational
management training methods8 and the buffer role
played by the development projects made possible
the purposeful construction of social capital, in con-
trast with Putnam’s claim that this is always a
side-effect of public actions aimed at other objec-
tives. It was the above-mentioned combination of
factors which made possible the construction of
peasant community social capital in Chiquimula. Re-
gardless of whether or not this community social
capital succeeds in bringing the expected benefits
(savings on transaction costs, creation of public
goods and the establishment of a strong civil soci-
ety), it is beyond question that it was possible to cre-
ate this capital in the space of only a few years.
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BOX 2
MEASURES FOR BUILDING RURAL COMMUNITY SOCIAL CAPITAL
– Search for submerged norms and practices of trust, reciprocity and cooperation in local descent groups in
peasant cultures apparently dominated by individualism and “familism”.
– Analyse and take advantage of favourable conditions for the resurgence of social capital created by the
weakening of authoritarian clientelism.
– Carry out an “archaeological dig” for social capital in order to identify previous social capital development
experiences that have been repressed or discouraged, but that are preserved in the collective oral historical
memory.
– Initiate social skill building in local descent groups consisting of no more than 10-15 households united by
kinship, residence and practice of reciprocity. Make sure that most such groups, not just dominant factions,
are represented in community-wide exercises to develop social capital.
– Provide repeated opportunities at the community level for the creation of ties of familiarity and coopera-
tion.
– Provide “cushioning” from regional authoritarian clientelism (both political and economic) for embryonic
peasant associations while the social skills of their leaders are honed and conflicts due to factionalism in
the associations are overcome.
– Be alert for minor shocks to systems of authoritarian clientelism that can weaken negative path dependence
and open windows of opportunity for the resurgence of peasant social capital.
– Develop rapid response capacity in projects and programmes to counteract moves by clientelistic actors in
transition phases and foment strategic negotiating capabilities among peasant leaders.
– Give priority to promoting a sense of mission among project personnel in favour of the development of au-
tonomous social capital.
– Promote open discussion of interpersonal networks that cross the boundaries between the government and
civil society. Facilitate access of excluded communities to connections that provide the information and ser-
vices already enjoyed by more integrated strata.
– Take steps to ensure that civic social capital in poor communities offers short-term material benefits as
well as gains in terms of political empowerment.
8 With regard to organizational management training methods,
see World Bank (1997), Cruz (1996), IAF (1995), RIMISP
(1996 and 1998), Rivera (1996), Toledo (1994) and Torres
(1998).
The present study suggests that, out of the six
factors identified as forming bases for social capital
building in Chiquimula, three were of key impor-
tance: the existence of forms of reciprocity in peas-
ant culture; the emergence of a climate of changes
favourable to the formation of peasant social actors,
and the internalization of community self-manage-
ment capabilities.
Everything seems to indicate that there is no
such thing as intrinsically “acivic” rural commu-
nities which totally lack the potential for social
capital building, but such potential may be buried
in past memories and in parts of the cultural rep-
ertoire which are currently in disuse. It should
however be acknowledged that the particular
forms of reciprocity in a community may be dif-
ferent from those existing in Chiquimula, which
are based on kinship in relatively stable local de-
scent groups. Even in such cases, however, there
may be other forms of reciprocity, associated with
other forms of kinship, which can be used as cul-
tural and social bricks for building community so-
cial capital institutions (box 2).
Furthermore, although the changes in the politi-
cal context in Chiquimula were particularly rapid and
dramatic, there have been cases in other countries
where seemingly minor changes have sparked off un-
expectedly dynamic processes of strengthening of
embryonic social actors. Any change in the configu-
ration of the elites and the political ethos can serve as
a “window of opportunity” permitting the construc-
tion of social capital.
Finally, in some cases self-management and po-
litical participation capabilities have been developed
by the communities themselves, without much out-
side help. However, the dual function played by out-
side agents –as providers of the methods available in
this field and as protective shields during the forma-
tion of new social actors on the local scene– is essen-
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